






















Introduction: The Asymmetry of 
Pursuing Good and Preventing Evil 
The central distinction in Derek 
Edyvane’s book Civic Virtue and the So-
vereignty of Evil: Political Ethics in Un-
certain Times is that between aspira-
tional politics and preventive politics. I 
am going to dedicate the first section of 
the paper to the analysis of this distinc-
tion.
There are authors who say that the 
two politics are symmetrical. In their 
opinion, preventing evil is preventing the 
loss of good, and therefore, the two poli-
tics, in their view, can be reduced to the 
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defends the thesis of the asymmetry be-
tween the two politics. Among other 
things, he appeals to the counterexam-
ple represented by the British Left that 
dishonored the pacifist ideal in order to 
prevent the evil of Nazism. This appears 
as a case that highlights the asymmetry. 
The former renounced pursuit of a good 
in order to avoid an evil, the great evil 
(as we will later see, a sovereign evil) of 
Nazism. In the case that he indicates, it 
appears that the British Left redirected 
its action from activities meant to im-
prove the social condition and justice 
(pursuing a good), to mere prevention 
of evil. The example, by itself, is not suf-
ficient to clarify the distinction, because 
it is not clear at first glance that pursuing 
the good of pacifism is not symmetri-
cal to the prevention of an evil. Pursuing 
the good of pacifism may be interpreted 
as preventing the evils of violence, kill-
ing, doing all the evils that one may do 
in a war. The first thing that we can note 
is that the distinction may not be mere-
ly a conceptual distinction between af-
firming and avoiding. It appears that, at 
least in the example, the affirmation of 
something is conceptually linked to the 
avoidance of something. 
The second important thing is that 
the redirection from the pursuing of a 
good to the avoidance of an evil must 
not be merely tactical, as it perhaps was 
in the case of the New Left. The politics 
of the New Left may be interpreted as a 
politics of prevention of evils, like the 
loss of goods such as freedom, democra-
cy, equality (maybe even the possibility 
to live in a moral order), which were in 
immediate danger, and renunciation of 
preventing the evil of using violence and 
killing was only temporarily postponed. 
Such tactical postponing is allowed 
by philosophers of politics that Edy-
vane would qualify as representatives of 
the aspirationalist politics. As an exam-
ple of the tactical renunciation of some 
goods, we may take Brian Barry, who, in 
his discussion of multiculturalism, af-
firms firmly the principle of equal treat-
ment against the policy of exemption for 
minority groups. He takes his proposal 
as a firm aspect of liberal egalitarian jus-
tice. But, on the other hand, he admits 
as legitimate temporary compromises 
that take in consideration the actual so-
cial reality and the need to avoid a so-
cial catastrophe in a specific condition. 
For this reason, for example, although 
he thinks that the politics of exemption 
on the basis of cultural specificities rep-
resents an infringement of the principle 
of equality endorsed by the conception 
of justice that he embraces, i.e. egalitar-
ian liberalism, he admits as legitimate 
to concede a temporary exemption to 
Sikhs from the law that obligates to wear 
helmets in the exercise of some jobs in 
order to avoid a situation of widely dif-
fused unemployment of members of this 
group. It is clear that the partial renun-
ciation of the pursuit of equality (or, in 
other words, of avoiding the evil of in-
equality) is only tactical and temporarily 
limited (Barry, 2000: 19-54). 
Edyvane’s distinction is to be inter-
preted as one between avoidance and 
prevention of the loss of core goods, i.e. 
avoidance and prevention of core evils, 
in contrast to avoidance and preven-
tion of a more extended list of evils, i.e. 
avoidance and prevention of the loss of a 
more extended list of goods. This is what 
Edyvane indicates as the distinction be-
tween contingent and sovereign, which, 
as he says, can ground two different con-
cepts of public morality. “First, we may 
interpret public morality in terms of 























gent evils, or, in other words, in terms of 
the promotion of those aspirations upon 
which contingent evil is contingent. Se-
condly, we may interpret public morality 
in terms of the prevention or mitigation 
of sovereign evils and the promotion of 
that for the elimination of which sove-
reign evil stands: the basic fabric of mo-
rality and of ordinary decency in public 
affairs” (Edyvane, 2012: IV, 14). Opting 
for the prevention of sovereign evils en-
tails a reorientation of the political fo-
cus and civic virtues: “one may come to 
understand better, and to identify more 
distinctly, the ordinary and indispensa-
ble decencies of public life which may 
be overlooked in the projection of liber-
al ideas of social improvement” (Hamp-
shire, in: ibid.).
At the end of this section, I indi-
cate that there is a point in this discus-
sion where it seems to me that Edyvane 
affirms a thesis that is very difficult to 
defend. When he speaks about preven-
tive politics, Edyvane indicates really ex-
treme cases: “The cases I have in mind 
are those in which the program of pre-
venting catastrophe entails the betrayal 
not of this or that ideal, but of every ide-
al to which the actor aspires. In such cas-
es, there is profound sociological asym-
metry between the politics of hope and 
the politics of fear” (Edyvane, 2012: II, 
9). But I worry whether it is possible to 
offer examples of those cases. The possi-
bilities are not so easily imagined, and it 
seems to me that betraying every ideal to 
which the actor aspires appears to her as 
a catastrophe by itself. 
Is Rawlsian Liberalism 
Aspirationalist? 
In his exemplifications of aspirational 
politics, Edyvane mentions, among oth-
ers, John Rawls. I will try to see wheth-
er Rawls can be properly interpreted as 
an aspirationalist in Edyvane’s terms, 
and if he can, why. Firstly, Rawls himself 
characterizes his position as a utopia, al-
though a realistic utopia (Rawls, 1999: 
11-23). Nevertheless, his utopia appears 
only as a more coherent realization of 
what is already included in our political 
culture, as well as in our political socie-
ty (western liberal democracies), judged 
by him as nearly just (James, 2005). In 
some cases, for example in his discus-
sion of civil disobedience and segrega-
tion, the goal appears as an extension to 
all of the rights recognized to the most 
(Rawls, 1971/1999: 319-343). 
Secondly, and this is a point strongly 
remarked by Edyvane, there is the con-
cept of overlapping consensus (Rawls, 
1993/1996: 133-172). Overlapping con-
sensus represents a sincere endorsement 
of basic principles of justice and it is a 
concept opposed to modus vivendi, a 
mere strategic endorsement of principles 
of justice. Overlapping consensus may 
appear as an aspirational concept, be-
cause it is related to an improvement of 
the moral condition of society, precisely 
the improvement that we have when we 
morally endorse a concept of justice. 
However, overlapping consensus 
has preventive and austere elements, as 
well. Firstly, one of the justifications of 
its superiority to modus vivendi is that it 
is more suitable to ensure stability and, 
therefore, to protect what we already 
have. Because of the fact that modus 
vivendi is only strategic, its adoption 
changes as soon as the conditions in 
which communities live change, and, 
therefore, the achievements of society 
are compromised. Secondly, overlapping 
consensus is focused on the principles of 
justice related to the constitutional es-
























ed with what Rawls thinks are primary 
goods, i.e. goods needed to protect and 
pursue any conception of good, and, be-
cause of this, overlapping consensus ap-
pears as instances of a preventive poli-
tics, and not of aspirationalist politics, 
according to the distinction that I have 
indicated in the first section. 
So, if Rawls is an aspirationalist, this 
is not because of his endorsement of 
overlapping consensus, but because of 
the theory of justice that he defends. En-
dorsing a liberal theory of justice may 
appear more than what is necessary to 
prevent what preventivists judge as evils 
on which they focus. Furthermore, Edy-
vane adds, it may even be disturbing, 
because of its impossibility to accom-
modate some worldviews and conciliate 
them. 
It may appear that Rawls himself 
agrees with this when he speaks of in-
ternational justice, where he renounces 
some aspects of freedom and the value 
of equality (Rawls, 1999: 1-88). When 
he speaks of international justice, for the 
sake of consensus and, therefore, stable 
cooperation with societies that are ready 
to be peaceful and cooperative provided 
their theocratic and hierarchic concep-
tion of justice is not threatened, Rawls 
accepts as legitimate the standards of jus-
tice of these societies in their domestic 
justice that are below the liberal stand-
ards in matters of freedom and equality, 
and this might indicate that he does not 
think that these standards are the mini-
mum acceptable for human beings. 
This discussion helps to locate where 
the aspirationalist elements of Rawls’s 
proposal lie. They are not primarily re-
lated to overlapping consensus as such 
that is directed toward stability and, in 
my opinion, this is why the overlap-
ping consensus appears more preven-
tively than aspirationally directed. It is 
certainly true that overlapping consen-
sus is a kind of moral improvement, a 
more sincere and committed adherence 
to justice than modus vivendi, but its 
central aspect is that of supporting sta-
bility. When speaking about the poli-
tics of prevention, Edyvane focuses on 
the protection of the sphere of ordinary 
life: “it is precisely the sphere of ordi-
nary life, and the things we have taken 
for granted, that are most immediately 
threatened and disrupted by the sort of 
catastrophe that the politics of preven-
tion guards against” (Edyvane, 2012: II, 
16). Without overlapping consensus and 
basing social cooperation on modus vi-
vendi, the protection of the sphere of or-
dinary life and the things we have taken 
for granted are threatened, although not 
immediately, and this is the reason why 
it appears to me as a preventive and not 
an aspirational element in Rawls’s politi-
cal thought. 
The aspirationalist elements, if any-
where, lie in the content of the theory of 
justice, that may appear as related to an 
ideal of a situation above the minimum 
required for a decent life that is repre-
sented by the decent hierarchical society 
pictured by Rawls in his The Law of Peo-
ples. However, it is important not to for-
get that Rawls’s theory of justice pictures 
an ideal society, but, nevertheless, he 
thinks of our society as nearly just. For 
this reason, his theory of justice appears 
in a sense preventive, i.e. in the sense of 
preventing the loss of the standards of 
freedom and equality, which is a loss for 
us, people who live in the Western po-
litical culture. 
This is not sufficient to classify 
Rawls as a preventivist according to the 
classification shown earlier, where as-























protection from a wider list of evils (i.e. 
contingent evils), while preventivists are 
oriented towards sovereign evils only. 
Because of the fact that Rawls indicates 
as acceptable a society below the stand-
ards of freedom and equality of liberal 
societies, it seems that liberal theories of 
justice, like Rawls’s, are focused on con-
tingent evils, and, therefore, are aspira-
tionalist theories. I will return to this is-
sue below. I now focus on the question: 
why does Edyvane think that preventiv-
ist theories are preferable to aspiration-
alist theories? 
In the discussion that follows I de-
bate only Edyvane’s view on procedu-
ralism and its role in the competition 
with liberal theories of justice. I avoid 
discussing, for example, proceduralist 
proposals that may function as comple-
ments of liberal theories of justice di-
rected to different concerns. Such a view 
is, for example, that of Emanuela Ceva, 
who speaks of proceduralism directed 
to management of conflicts and not to 
their resolution (Ceva, 2008). 
Preventive Politics 
and Proceduralism 
The reason why Edyvane rejects li-
beral theories of justice, like Rawls’s, is 
that, in his opinion, they are too ambi-
tious and, as such, unsuitable to face 
the major challenges of the contempo-
rary world. The liberal theory of justice 
is judged as unsuitable because it can-
not be the matter of shared acceptance. 
In order for liberal theories of justice to 
be the focus of overlapping consensus, 
it must be possible to obtain consensus 
on their principles of justice, contrary to 
what happens, in Rawls’s opinion, in re-
lations to concepts of good. But Edyvane 
says: “The trouble is that this account of 
the asymmetry between the right and 
the good depends for its plausibility on 
a particular and controversial concep-
tion of the human faculty of reason or 
of moral thought. The basic idea is that 
moral thought is convergent thought: in 
idealised circumstances, relieved of the 
burdens of judgment, reasonable people 
could be expected to reach agreement 
about morality and the good. The failure 
to reach agreement is a sign of defect, 
a sign, as Rawls puts it, that something 
somewhere has gone ‘wrong’ (1993, 55). 
To explain this defect, Rawls invokes the 
burdens of judgment: because the world 
is a complicated place and because each 
of us draws on a different set of life ex-
periences, it is impossible for reason to 
achieve perfect convergence on a com-
prehensive conception of the good life. 
However, the burdens of judgment are 
not so great as to vitiate the convergent 
tendency of reason altogether – it is pos-
sible for reasonable people to reach a 
more modest kind of moral consensus: 
an ‘overlapping’ consensus on the consti-
tutional essentials by which they can live 
together” (Edyvane, 2012: III, 12-13).
Edyvane’s objection says: “What rea-
son have we to think that, relieved of the 
burdens of judgment, reasonable people 
would actually reach agreement on mo-
rality? At this point, my earlier appeal to 
history takes on renewed force: there is 
nowhere evidence that moral thought 
tends naturally to converge in the way 
Rawls suggests. [...] It is not obvious that 
there is any more reason to assume with 
Rawls that moral thought unburdened 
will tend to consensus than there is to 
believe that moral thought is fundamen-
tally divergent and that the rare achieve-
ment of moral consensus in human af-
fairs is always restricted to a particular 
constituency and is always liable to be 
























As a consequence of these remarks, 
Edyvane endorses an attitude differ-
ent from that of Rawlsians toward those 
who do not accept political liberalism. 
For Rawlsians, those who do not accept 
political liberalism are simply to be la-
beled as unreasonable, but the problem 
for Rawlsians is that they have nothing 
to say about the conciliations of conflicts 
relevant for the present time.
It is worth looking into the sorts of 
conflicts to the conciliation of which 
liberal justice cannot contribute. As we 
can see in a quotation from Hampshire, 
it appears that what is involved is “The 
relation between two kinds of society: 
on the one hand, self-consciously tradi-
tional societies and governments, where 
priests of the church, or rabbis or imams 
or mullahs, and other experts in the will 
of God, maintain a single conception 
of the good that determines the way of 
life of the society as a whole; and on the 
other hand, the liberal democratic socie-
ties and governments that permit, or en-
courage, a plurality of conceptions of the 
good” (Hampshire, in: ibid.: III, 14). 
The problem that appears here, and 
that, in Edyvane’s view, makes Rawls’s 
proposal implausible, is that his liberal 
proposal, and liberalism in general, ap-
pears as a partisan theory that cannot 
be the focus of conciliation of different 
worldviews. Partisanship can be over-
come and conciliation pursued if we fo-
cus not on the ambitious concerns of lib-
erals but on sovereign evils that are to be 
prevented. Sovereign evils are evils inde-
pendently of “the norms of any particu-
lar way of life or any set of moral ideas” 
(Edyvane, 2012: IV, 9). Contingent evils 
are evils in relation to particular ways of 
life and sets of moral ideas and to the loss 
of something intended as good in these 
contexts. Such is, for example, inequality, 
an evil only from the standpoint of egali-
tarian conceptions of justice. 
Edyvane connects his focus on so-
vereign evils with a proceduralist thesis, 
i.e. he proposes to renounce substantive 
theories of justice and to focus on proce-
dures that help finding conciliation. Pre-
ventive politics does not focus on specific 
contents of justice, like Rawls’s proposal. 
Instead, it may “be realised and institu-
tionalised in an indefinite variety of ways 
in different places and times and its pre-
cise manifestation is liable to be shaped 
by the prevailing customs and conven-
tions in any given social context. [...] 
Moreover, not all instantiations [...] will 
be congenial to the liberal democratic 
temperament. [...] Nevertheless, in each 
instantiation [...] there will be a com-
mon element: the abstract prohibition 
on the collapse of civilized life” (ibid.: V, 
14). Preventive politics renounces to the 
protection of liberal principles of justice, 
and it “is concerned with fairness in the 
procedures for the negotiation of con-
flict” (ibid.: VI, 2). The reason is that it 
is directed to the prevention of “anarchy 
in which conflicts are settled not institu-
tionally, through argument, but instead 
by intimidation and violence. Reflection 
on these evils yields an understanding 
of justice as related to procedures, to the 
processes of argument, rather than out-
comes” (ibid.: VI, 1).
So, proceduralism is congenial to the 
prevention of sovereign evils, such as an-
archy, intimidation and violence: “The 
universality of procedural justice derives 
simply from the fact that it responds to 
a perennial predicament in human life: 
the need to prevent inevitable conflicts 
of aspiration from boiling over into 
a state of war” (ibid.: VI, 2). Or, again: 
“always and everywhere societies have 























been attracted to procedural justice as a 
mode of conflict negotiation, as a way of 
preventing the otherwise inevitable de-
scent into the great evils of anarchy and 
war” (ibid.: VI, 8). Procedural justice has 
two distinctive parts. One is the princi-
ple that each side has an equal right to be 
listened to and understood. The second 
is the institutionalization, which can be 
local in its forms. 
Are Edyvane’s Sovereign Evils 
Universal?
It seems to me that we must under-
stand sovereign evils as more related to 
people’s worldviews, and therefore as 
more contextual than Edyvane thinks. 
He interprets sovereign evils as objec-
tive, independent of what people think 
of them. As he says, it is not their be-
ing universally felt as sovereign evils 
that makes them such. “The claim is not 
that evil is simply what people feel to be 
evil, and it need not even be that evil is 
what most people feel to be evil. It may 
be (and it has happened) that most peo-
ple at a given time and in a given society 
have been distracted from natural feel-
ing by theories that operate to explain 
away the viscerally felt evils of human 
life” (ibid.: IV, 18). 
But – this is my opinion – for conflict 
negotiation and avoidance of anarchy 
and war we must focus on what people 
feel or think as being of primary impor-
tance, and not on what, perhaps, is of 
primary importance. This is because the 
reasons that orient people’s actions, in-
clusive the acceptance of a political and 
legal order, depend on what they feel or 
think is true, and not on what is true. 
As a consequence, Edyvane cannot 
avoid the same defect that he attributes 
to the liberal project, i.e. that of not hav-
ing the possibility to find conciliation 
with people opposed to liberalism, like 
“priests of the church, or rabbis or im-
ams or mullahs, and other experts in 
the will of God, [who] maintain a sin-
gle conception of the good that deter-
mines the way of life of the society as 
a whole” (Hampshire, in: ibid.: III, 15). 
These people coincide widely with the 
people that Edyvane indicates as not re-
ceptive of sovereign evils because of hav-
ing been distracted from natural feeling. 
Because of this distraction, they are not 
concerned with the avoidance of what 
Edyvane characterizes as sovereign evils, 
while they perceive as sovereign evils 
other things, like living in sin. For such 
people it may be deserving to kill or die 
instead of focusing on “procedural jus-
tice as a mode of conflict negotiation, as 
a way of preventing the otherwise inevi-
table descent into the great evils of an-
archy and war” (Edyvane, 2012: VI, 18). 
Consequently, it seems that Edyvane’s 
proposal does not have any comparative 
advantage in relation to the thesis that 
he opposes for finding conciliation with 
these people. 
Edyvane might reply by saying that 
although these people feel, or think, as 
dominant some values particular for 
them (like avoidance of living in sin), 
they also feel, or think, as all other peo-
ple, that the evils indicated by him as 
sovereign evils are indeed evils. Al-
though, contrary to many others, a rival 
to liberalism from the list above may feel 
that the greatest evil is living in sin, she, 
like all other people, feels that death or 
the death of a loved one is an evil. This 
is why the latter are sovereign evils and 
they can represent the ground of concili-
ation.
Although it may be true that there 
are some evils so universally felt about or 
























regard to Edyvane’s proposal. Every per-
son – in particular if she is so strongly 
attached to her values, like people with 
worldviews rival to liberalism indicated 
in the list above – wants to protect all her 
values, in the order of importance that 
she attributes to them, and not only the 
values that she shares with other people. 
If a person thinks that living in sin is the 
overriding sovereign evil, she is ready 
to sacrifice the sovereign evils that Edy-
vane mentions. The fact (if it is a fact, 
like Edyvane says) that some evils are 
universal, while others are particular 
to a person or a group, does not change 
that it is the latter that are felt about, or 
thought of, as overriding sovereign evils, 
and that the person or the group con-
forms to them the reasons for action, 
and, as it is relevant for the present de-
bate, the acceptance of a political or legal 
order. Consequently, Edyvane does not 
indicate a common ground for finding 
conciliation, i.e. the base for preventing 
the catastrophes that he indicates, i.e. an-
archy and war, which he remarked as the 
problem of the targets of his critique.
Edyvane’s proposal is based on the 
conflation between two possible clas-
sifications of evils that must be distin-
guished. We must distinguish between 
sovereign evils and contingent evils on 
the one hand, and between universal 
evils and contingent evils on the other. 
Sovereign evils are the evils that hu-
man beings dominantly want to avoid, 
and they vary depending on cultural 
and other reasons, while, in this distinc-
tion, contingent evils are evils that they 
want to avoid provided that sovereign 
evils are avoided (evils that they want 
to avoid, let’s say, in good times). Uni-
versal evils are evils that are such for all 
human beings, while, in this distinction, 
contingent evils are such only for some 
people. Edyvane grounds his politics for 
avoiding anarchy and war on universal 
evils which he erroneously takes as so-
vereign evils, and, therefore, as overrid-
ing reasons for action for everybody. But 
they are not so, because sovereign evils 
are different for different persons, and, 
therefore, the reasons for action for peo-
ple vary, as well as their criteria of ac-
ceptance of political and legal orders.
Because sovereign evils are contex-
tual, what is aspirational and what is 
preventive politics – varies. So, the loss 
of values that are such in a liberal view 
of justice (freedom and some form of 
equality), like Rawls’s, represents a so-
vereign evil in a liberal society, perhaps 
even a catastrophe, and, therefore, a con-
ception that protects from them must be 
classified according to the typology in-
dicated in the first section of the paper 
as preventive politics, although maybe 
only in our society. In other societies, 
such values might be related to aspira-
tionalist politics, e.g. in the case of de-
cent peoples that Rawls describes in his 
Law of Peoples. 
Ultimately, such a contextualized dis-
tinction between preventive and aspira-
tional politics appears only as a methodo-
logical tool, i.e. as a way of approaching 
the political agenda among people who 
share a worldview, by giving a privileged 
consideration to what is most important 
to this group. 
Edyvane bases his recommendation 
of proceduralism over liberal theories of 
justice on the distinction between pre-
ventive and aspirational politics, indi-
cating that proceduralism fits well with 
preventive politics, and aspirationalism 
with liberal theories of justice. Because 
of the fact that the distinction between 
preventive and aspirational politics is 























shown above, the preference of pre-
ventive over aspirational politics is un-
founded. This is the primary concern 
of this paper. But my complete view is 
that there is more to say in favor of lib-
eral theories of justice. I will dedicate the 
final part of the paper to some remarks 
with this intention. 
Liberalism and a Particularly 
Important Sovereign Evil
Although I have tried to contextual-
ize sovereign evils, at the end of this part 
of the discussion I would like to point 
to an evil that might be particularly im-
portant, which is neglected by Edyvane. 
This is the evil of the impossibility to live 
in accordance with the demands of con-
science. The issue is developed by Chan-
dran Kukathas. His political theory is 
based on the anthropology that he em-
braces. Although he remarks that “the 
human world is marked by diversities 
– of language, custom, religion or, more 
generally, of culture” (Kukathas, 2003: 
41), and such “diversity may be an in-
escapable and permanent feature of hu-
man societies, there is also a core human 
nature” (ibid.). Common human mo-
tives are particularly important for the 
construction of Kukathas’s theory. Re-
lying on Hume, he indicates three kinds 
of human motivations: interest (in the 
sense of self-interest), affection (attach-
ments individuals have to others), and 
conscience (or principle, as Hume says; 
I use the two words as interchangeable 
here). As Kukathas indicates, “people 
are motivated by principle [...] because 
they desire to do what is right. Humans 
have not only a capacity for disinterested 
conduct, but also a strong desire to act as 
‘propriety’ demands” (ibid.: 47). In Ku-
kathas’s opinion, conscience is the most 
important human motivation: “con-
science is what not only guides us (for 
the most part) but what we think should 
guide us. [...] This motivation structures 
– and so, governs – human life more pro-
foundly than any other. While we pur-
sue our own interests and the interests 
of others we hold in affection, we do so 
within the bounds of propriety” (ibid.: 
48-49). Accordingly, conscience has a 
prominent place in the construction of 
Kukathas’s theory. But if what he says 
is true, it must have a prominent place 
in the construction of any kind of sta-
ble and peaceful society, because refusal 
of respect for the demands of conscience 
is the overriding and universal sovereign 
evil felt by all the parts. A society can be 
peaceful, stable and cooperative only if it 
protects fairly well the conscience of all.
Liberal theories offer strong protec-
tion of the demands of conscience in 
various forms. One possibility, for ex-
ample, is that put forward by Kukathas,1 
who thinks of the free society as a soci-
ety of mutual toleration of different as-
sociations that need not ensure freedom 
in their internal relations, but only offer 
to their members the right to exit. The 
only role of the state in such an order is 
to care about the peaceful coexistence of 
these groups and about the right to exit 
(ibid.: 97-98). Another possibility is that 
the state cares about guaranteeing the 
respect of liberal rights of all individuals, 
but it permits the voluntary constitution 
of associations that do not internally re-
spect liberal rights, although they must 
respect the right to exit of their mem-
bers. There are other possibilities. The 
important thing is that if it is true that 
liberal societies can offer respect of con-
1 Contrary to many other liberals, Kukathas 
would not describe his position as a theory of 
























science better than their alternatives, 
the acceptance of a liberal society finds 
an important piece of evidence in its 
support. Edyvane himself would have 
a strong reason for preferring a liberal 
conception of justice. As I said above, 
the reason is that, if Kukathas is right, 
living in a way disrespectful of the de-
mands of conscience is the overriding 
and universal sovereign evil. 
It might be objected to this that con-
science is for many people not as im-
portant as Kukathas says. There appear 
to be numerous examples among politi-
cians (but I am afraid that the academic 
environment would be a suitable source 
of counterexamples as well). Let’s think 
about the former Italian Prime Mini-
ster, Silvio Berlusconi, at least as he is 
described by many of his critics. Many 
say that there is sufficient evidence that 
he does not care about the demands of 
conscience neither in intimate relations 
(as shown by his cheating on his wife) 
nor in relation to the state (as it is visi-
ble in his consciously committing finan-
cial criminal acts), in particular in rela-
tion to the duties of his public office (by 
adjusting laws to his need of avoiding 
criminal prosecution).
Nevertheless, I don’t think that peo-
ple like the Berlusconi described above 
threaten the view that highlights con-
science as important for justifying a 
view about good society. Such a view 
must be justified to people who have 
reasons to oppose it. Such possible op-
ponents are among people who take se-
riously the demands of conscience. On 
the other hand, people like the Berlus-
coni described above have no reasons to 
oppose the constitution and the persist-
ence of a good society. They only need to 
free ride in it by disrespecting its laws, or 
by adjusting its laws only to a small ex-
tent and only temporarily to their sinis-
ter interests. 
The real problem for liberalism and 
its resources for the protection of con-
science is represented by some among 
the above-mentioned experts in God’s 
will, more precisely, the fundamentalists 
among them. Liberalism does not have 
much to say to such people. The ma-
jor resource that liberalism has is to ex-
hibit the advantages of living in a stable 
peaceful cooperation. These advantag-
es include the ability of different world-
views and ways of living to survive in a 
liberal society, and many of them can 
even flourish, not only those that privi-
lege individual choice-making, i.e. au-
tonomy as a comprehensive view about 
good life as distinct from political au-
tonomy, i.e. the freedom to not be li-
mited in the choice of worldviews and 
ways of life, if one wants to make such 
choices. Liberalism’s appeal will not be 
strong for most fundamentalists, but has 
proved to be efficient for many others 
among experts in God’s will and, in gene-
ral, opponents of individual autonomy 
in the sense of a comprehensive view of 
good life. As Barry says: “If the parties 
want peace enough to make the conces-
sions that are needed to reduce their de-
mands so that they become compatible, 
liberalism proposes a formula for do-
ing so. More than that, liberal principles 
can make a moral appeal as a fair way of 
solving conflict, because they offer the 
parties equal treatment. There is, how-
ever, no guarantee that either peace or 
equity will be regarded by everybody as 
more important than winning – that is 
to say undertaking courses of action de-
structive of civility that are derived from 
religious beliefs” (Barry, 2000: 25).
In conclusion, it can be said that li-























who already accept the value of a peace-
ful and stable cooperative pluralistic or-
der, but also to many others who can see 
reasons to accept such an order. 
Is Proceduralism Sufficient 
to Prevent Anarchy and War? 
The last concern that I will indicate 
is that proceduralism of the kind en-
dorsed by Edyvane, by itself, even if en-
dorsed by all the parts, is not sufficient 
to prevent catastrophes. The recent war 
in former Yugoslavia is a fitting exam-
ple. Before the war, there were meet-
ings of the leaders of the republics of the 
former federation on how to reform it. 
The form of the debates corresponded 
even to the strongest interpretation of 
the procedural view endorsed by Edy-
vane, i.e. not only did each participant 
have the possibility to be listened to, but 
this possibility was fair and equal. Presi-
dents of the six republics of the former 
federation met several times, and as far 
as it is possible to know, their meetings 
followed the rules of procedural fair-
ness and equality. Nevertheless, this was 
eventually followed by the tragedy of the 
war. A possible interpretation is that the 
war was inevitable because there was no 
common substantial adherence to prin-
ciples of justice. One of the sides ap-
pealed to the right of the biggest and 
most diffused nation in the federation 
to not be divided, with parts of it facing 
the fate of becoming national minori-
ties. Other sides appealed to the right 
of having independent national states. 
The war might have been the conse-
quence of the inability of conciliation 
between these views on justice. Proba-
bly at least some sides in the conflict ap-
pealed to principles of justice only in or-
der to cover their desire for power over 
a territory. With regard to these cases it 
can at least be said that proceduralism 
does not have any better resource than 
liberalism. But there is another impor-
tant consideration. It is improbable that 
as wide masses of people as needed for 
a war could have been motivated if they 
did not feel that they were suffering, or 
were under the risk of suffering, an in-
justice. Again, it appears important and 
helpful to focus the debate on issues of 
substantial justice. Just as I have shown 
in relation to religious issues, liberalism 
in various forms could have had an im-
portant role to play here, with its vari-
ous proposals meant to conciliate na-
tional demands.
In this section I have focused on the 
importance of substantial conceptions 
of justice in order to prevent degenera-
tion to a conflict. But embracement of 
conceptions of justice is important in or-
der to prevent degeneration from a fairly 
good society. This is indicated by Rawls 
when he speaks about the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic: “A cause of the fall of 
Weimar’s constitutional regime was that 
none of the traditional elites of Germa-
ny supported its constitution or were 
willing to cooperate to make it work” 
(Rawls, 1993/1996: lix). 
Finally, there is a point on which I 
agree with Edyvane. It is wrong to mere-
ly perceive as unreasonable the people 
who reject liberal justice. This is a wrong 
approach, because it may alienate and 
even radicalize these people. The right 
approach is to try to have respectful di-
alogue with them, but in such dialogue 
liberalism is not just one partisan theo-
ry among others. The first reason is that 
liberalism appears as the most plausible 
candidate for protection from a parti-
cularly important sovereign evil: that of 
disrespect for demands of conscience. 
























already proved to be a successful meth-
od of overcoming the sovereign evils of 
war and anarchy (in the sense of civil 
war, which, as it seems to me, is the core 
meaning of the word for Edyvane) and 
to be able to conciliate different world-
views and claims. It is important to re-
member its historical origin. Liberalism 
appeared as the way out of religious wars 
that were irresolvable until religions re-
strained their wish to control the public 
sphere. Liberalism’s privatization of reli-
gions, although not universally accept-
ed, proved to be the most reliable way 
of establishing peaceful coexistence and 
stable cooperation invented by human-
ity, although probably it needs sufficient 
reasons shared by people for peace and 
cooperation (Barry, 2000: 24-32). This 
is not a small achievement, since people 
frequently want to avoid conflicts and 
find equilibrium between this goal and 
the other goals that they have, but do not 
know how to do that. The third reason is 
that the loss of the values of liberalism 
is a sovereign evil, although it might be 
perceived as such only by us, members 
of the Western civilization.
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Javna etika suvereniteta zla i politički liberalizam
SAŽETAK U članku se raspravlja o preventivnom proceduralnom konceptu politike nasu-
prot aspirativnom liberalnom konceptu na način na koji su oni predstavljeni u knjizi Dere-
ka Edyvanea Civic Virtue and the Sovereignty of Evil: Political Ethics in Uncertain Times (Gra-
đanska vrlina i suverenitet zla: politička etika u nesigurnim vremenima). Autor upozorava na 
nužnost konceptualnog razlikovanja između suverenih i univerzalnih zala te nudi obranu 
liberalnog koncepta pravednosti.
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